Οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἕκαστον ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἀπείρων τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀριθμεῖν, εἰ ἄρα τις καὶ νοήσειεν οὕτως ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ἀπείρων τὴν διάνοιαν. ὅπερ ἴσως ἀδύνατον· οὐ γὰρ ἐν συνεχέσι καὶ ὑποκειμένους ἡ τῆς διανοίας κίνησις, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν φερομένον.
Again, the process of the mind touching an infinite series one by one is not the process of counting, if indeed anyone supposes that the mind does in this way touch an infinite series. Perhaps this supposition is in itself impossible; for the movement of the mind does not take place like the movement of travelling bodies in continuous matter.
–[Aristotle] (On Indivisible Lines, 969a 32f., trans. W.S. Hett)